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Volume Introduction: Gilbert Ryle on Propositions,
Propositional Attitudes, and Theoretical
Knowledge
Julia Tanney
In the introduction to the special volume, Gilbert Ryle: Intelli-
gence, Practice and Skill, Julia Tanney introduces the contribu-
tions of Michael Kremer, Stina Bäckström and Martin Gustafs-
son, and Will Small, each of which indicates concern about the
appropriation of Ryle’s distinction between knowing-how and
knowing-that in seminal work in contemporary epistemology.
Expressing agreementwith the authors that something has gone
awry in these borrowings from Ryle, Tanney takes this criticism
to a deeper level. She argues that the very notion of content-
bearing, causally-efficacious mental states, let alone represen-
tational states of knowledge-that or knowledge-how, embodies
the very presuppositions that Ryle calls into question in his re-
jection of classical theories of meaning and his related warning
of the type-errors involved in conflating rational and mecha-
nistic explanation. That these mental posits are presupposed,
unchallenged, in today’s debates make his arguments against
intellectualism particularly difficult to discern.
Special Issue: Gilbert Ryle: Intelligence, Practice, Skill
Edited by Juliet Floyd and Lydia Patton
Volume Introduction: Gilbert Ryle on
Propositions, Propositional Attitudes, and
Theoretical Knowledge
Julia Tanney
Introduction
This special issue of the Journal of the History of Analytic Philoso-
phy features critical discussions of recent work in epistemology
that engage with the writings of Gilbert Ryle. The particular
focus of concern is with Ryle’s distinction between “knowledge-
how” and “knowledge-that” and his regress arguments against
the intellectualist. Alarmed that Ryle is often accused of an
“anti-intellectualism” which reduces to mechanical habit, each
paper offers suggestions as to how one might find material for a
middle ground between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism
(thus understood) in Ryle’s discussion of dispositions, capac-
ities, abilities and tendencies and in his distinction between
habit and repetition on the one hand and skill and learning
on the other. Important themes from Ryle’s work emerge and
the authors offer their insights, by and large within a spirit of
cooperation with the burgeoning epistemological literature on
“knowledge-how”.
Their correctives come as much-needed relief, for at the cen-
tre of arguments in epistemology to which these papers allude
are those that explore whether knowledge-how is propositional
knowledge, whether Ryle takes knowing how to be a distinc-
tive kind of non-propositional state, and whether a reasonable
intellectualist might hold that the action is guided by proposi-
tional knowledge in such a way that this does amount to some
sort of prior theoretical operation. These explorations occur
against a background in which Ryle is interpreted as advanc-
ing behaviourist views, denying the existence of mental states,
clinging to a verificationist theory of meaning, or espousing a
form of anti-realism about dispositions, and whose targets in
his discussion of intellectualism, if they can be discerned at all,
are directed toward a “straw man”. The context, thus, is one in
which some of the very assumptions that Ryle was so keen to
dismantle are so entrenched that his arguments are practically
impossible to fathom.
To bring this home, however, will involve examining the top-
ics of concernwithin the context of Ryle’s rejection of traditional
theories of meaning whose key tenets are implicitly accepted in
discussions in analytic philosophy of mind and epistemology
today. Thus, after introducing the critical articles that make up
this special volume, I shall mark out a particular trail through
his body of work which allows us to grasp the radicalness of
his views in philosophical logic, how these affect the logical
implications or saying-power of expressions using, for exam-
ple, the verb “know”, and, finally, what disturbed him about
the rationalism embodied in, among other topics, the philoso-
phy of language, mind, maths, and morals. As we shall see,
a fil conducteur throughout this tour concerns the notion of a
proposition and, correspondingly, that of a propositional atti-
tude understood as a particular type of mental state. Much
of the difficulty of assimilating Ryle into contemporary episte-
mology and philosophy of mind is due to the fact that these
philosophical notions, highly problematic from Ryle’s point of
view, are simply taken for granted in today’s discussions.
* * *
Michael Kremer sets the context of current debates in episte-
mology by quoting a key passage in which Ryle complains that
philosophers have not done justice to the familiar distinction be-
tween knowing that something is the case and knowing how to
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do things. They focus on the discovery of truths or facts, while
either ignoring “the discovery of ways and methods of doing
things” or by attempting to reduce ways of gleaning knowledge
to the discovery of facts. In assuming that intelligence “equates
to the contemplation of propositions and is exhausted in this
contemplation” they face a vicious regress. For, as Kremer says,
summarising the argument, “intelligent acts must be backed by
intelligent internal acts of considering regulative propositions,
which in turn must be backed by further intelligent internal
acts of considering meta-regulative propositions, and so on, ad
infinitum.”
Kremer’s approach to the topic of intellectualism and the dis-
tinction between “knowledge-how” and “knowledge-that” is
distinctive and unique, for instead of considering the topic a-
temporally, or in the light of today’s concerns, he turns to the
preoccupations of those in an array of disciplines who were
likely to have influenced Ryle at the time he was writing. In
“Ryle’s ‘Intellectualist Legend’ in Historical Context” he takes
on the challenge, posed by at least one of the early reviewers of
The Concept of Mind and still alive in the epistemological liter-
ature today, that Ryle’s opponent “intellectualist” was a straw
man. Kremer sets out to show whose views were in the target
range with a detailed examination of the decades-long debate
between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism that spanned
the disciplines of psychology, economics, political science, and
sociology, as well as philosophy while Ryle was writing, with
special emphasis on the way this dialectic played out between
the two World Wars. It is a common assumption today that
since Ryle argued vociferously against intellectualism, which he
dubbed “the prevailing doctrine of the time”, he could safely
be called an “anti-intellectualist”. Kremer warns us against this
assumption.
Using what he calls “indirect evidence” from books Ryle
owned and comments he made in margins, Kremer argues that
Ryle would have been well aware of particular disputes across
a variety of disciplines. He suggests that philosophers such as
G. F. Stout and Ryle’s own colleague Susan Stebbing represent
the intellectualist; the psychologist Wilhelm Wundt, the politi-
cal scientistWallas, and the social scientistMcDougall speak out
in favour of the anti-intellectualist. But the latter group, who
tended to emphasise instinct, emotion, subjective feelings, im-
pulses, volitions, non-rational, and simple automatic behaviour
are not espousing a position congenial to Ryle, who, Kremer
argues, would have had no truck with it either. Both, he claims,
over-intellectualise the intellect. Kremer argues that Ryle is try-
ing to steer a middle ground between intellectualism and (what
has become known as) “anti-intellectualism”. Ryle’s discussion
of “knowledge-how”, instead, emphasises the important aspect
of human rationality as a capacity for reasonableness, or the
capacity to get things right, that does not depend on prior de-
liberation or theoretical reasoning.
In “Skill, Drill, and Intelligent Performance: Ryle and Intel-
lectualism”, Stina Bäckström and Martin Gustafsson also diag-
nose a misunderstanding in those who view Ryle as an “anti-
intellectualist” in the sense Kremer identifies above. Urging that
we reexamine what it means to think about what we are doing so
that it does not fall foul either of the regress or collapse the
notion of being guided by instruction, they draw attention to the
type-distinction Ryle makes between intelligent action which
involves skill and learning on the one hand and mechanical
habit, consisting of mere repetition and drill, on the other. This
category distinction, they argue, can best be understood as a
difference in form in which understanding, variability, learning,
being open to—and (I would add) adjusting one’s performance
in the light of—criticism, using one’s judgment in novel situa-
tions, becoming a self-critic, and so on, play an essential role.
The introduction of such factors does not involve a causal claim
to the effect that every skilful performance must have resulted
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from learning and training in which such activities occurred. It
is rather to say that the characterisation of a performance as skil-
ful opens up a logical space in which questions about criticism,
correction, and talk about one’s own judgment, past efforts, and
attempts to get it right are appropriate. This contrasts with how
such issues are inappropriate, irrelevant, or evince a misunder-
standing if we were to pose them when the performance is a
matter of mere habit or the training mere drill.
By way of analogy, the authors consider Ryle’s discussion of
dispositional concepts and his example of a bird flying south. To
characterise the bird as migrating opens up the logical space—
one embodied in the biological concept of migration—to ad-
vance a more pregnant, or “thicker” explanation in response
to the question “Why is the bird flying south?” than one which
wouldnominate a prior event to answer a straightforward causal
question. Similarly, the difference in logical space that is opened
up by introducing characteristically mental concepts, such as
thinking, will be neglected if one insists on taking the verb to
name an occurrence. Of course, we might add, there is such a
thing as deliberating ahead of time, of putting down the tennis
racket in order to picture or describe in one’s mind the moves to
be made. But this kind of exercise, which may indeed be part
of learning, far from being a necessary concomitant of perfor-
mancewemay characterise as thoughtful, will hardly be likely to
help the player during a match. Instead, the required notion of
thinking needs to be understood much more broadly, such that
criticism and correction—indeed, the very question, “why did
you do it like that?”—is relevant. This question would still be in
the picture even if, on occasion, the answer “it was a mistake”
admits that a particular move was aberrant.
Bäckström andGustafsson argue that this way of understand-
ing what Ryle was doing in giving his “dispositional analysis”
of mental concepts belies the claim that Ryle was a reductive be-
haviourist, as certain philosophers continue to insist. Ryle’s aim
was to preserve the distinction between intelligent action and,
say, mechanical habit or mere repetition, but to do so in a way
that avoids the regress threatening the intellectualist construal
of intelligence.
Will Small, in “Ryle on the Explanatory Role of Knowl-
edge How”, registers a complaint—in tandem with the other
authors—that today’s focus on “whether or not knowledge how
is propositional knowledge” tends to obscure Ryle’s real con-
cern, namely “how human behaviour comes to be invested with
those ‘qualities of mind’ that are the markers of intelligence”.
This can only be appreciated, he suggests, if we look at the
central chapters of The Concept of Mind as a unity, and not sim-
ply, as epistemologists tend to do, at Ryle’s explicit discussions
of knowing-how and knowing-that. We will see that Ryle’s pri-
mary goal, according to Small, is to showwhat difficulties attend
the idea that explanation of action, whether in terms of motive,
intention, voluntariness, or reason, is to be cashed out by an
explanation of a bodily movement produced by an inner, “men-
tal” cause. Just as voluntary, intentional, and rational action are
not mere movements derivatively promoted in virtue of having
been caused by inner mental states, events, or processes that we
call “volitions”, “intentions” and “reasons”, respectively, nor is
intelligent action mere behaviour that has culminated from in-
ner intellectual operations. According to Small, Ryle’s goal is
to reject causalism, thus described, and instead to offer “a dis-
positional alternative—without, however, lapsing into a merely
mechanical, or animal, or sub-rational or non-rational disposi-
tional explanation of the relevant aspects of human action.”
Small expresses alarm at the double suggestion that Ryle takes
knowing-how to be a distinctive kind of non-propositional state
and that, in order to revealRyle’s true aims, the argument against
the intellectualist should be reformulated in such a way as to
make room for a “reasonable intellectualist”. A reasonable in-
tellectualist would be one who holds that action is “guided by
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propositional knowledge” in such a way that it does not involve
prior theoretical operations. Small’s argument against thismove
(which he also attributes to Ellen Fridland) involves exploiting
a particular ambiguity in what is involved in “being guided by
propositional knowledge”. Suppose it is true, he says, that as
Ginet puts it, “I exercise (manifest) my knowledge that one can
get the door open by turning the knob and pushing it (as well as
my knowledge that there is a door there) by performing that op-
eration quite automatically . . . without formulating (inmymind
or out loud) that proposition or any other relevant proposition”
(Ginet 1975, 7). Then, says Small on Ryle’s behalf, such an in-
dividual is likely to know that there are many ways of opening
the door. Some of these would not and some would count as
intelligent. Even on the assumption that he made an intelligent
selection from this stock of knowledge, his execution of it can
still be assessed as intelligent or not.
If practical knowledge amounts to “propositional knowledge
of special kinds of facts known under a practical mode of pre-
sentation” we are nonetheless owed a story about the assumed
intelligence of the marshalling of this propositional knowledge.
(Not to mention, it seems to me, a story about the assumed in-
telligence with which we respond to this mode of presentation.)
When the opponent responds, as he must, that theoretical oper-
ations peter out eventually and automatic responses take over,
Small accuses him of not meeting his own goals of giving us
an account of how these automatic responses can be part of an
account that renders the various aspects of a skilled movement
intelligent.
In a discussion that has bynowbecomeurgent, Smallwonders
what it could possibly mean to construe propositional knowl-
edge as inner mental states “guiding” behaviour. Small ac-
knowledges that philosophy of action is rife with the image of
an agent and/or her mental states “guiding” her bodily move-
ments but notes that as far as he is aware, nobody has been able
to navigate between the two followingunacceptable alternatives.
If the “guidance” is something that happens to the agent, it does
not amount to “his” guidance. If guidance itself involves a series
of actions (as he suggests above) then a regress threatens. It is
thus no accident, he says, that Ryle’s “unreasonable” intellectu-
alism targets a phenomenon in which it at least makes sense to
talk of being guided by one’s apprehension of truths.
* * *
In what follows I shall attempt to weave together some of the
themes treated in the discussions above within the context of
Ryle’s views in philosophical logic and the role of philosophy,
and theway these aremanifested inhis discussionofmental con-
cepts. Understanding his arguments involves appreciating his
departure from a tradition that drives much philosophical dis-
cussion today. His early concern to understand how philosophy
could steer a path between excessive postulation of transcen-
dent entities on the one hand, and (what he called) the “sub-
jectivist, idea-psychology” of Locke, Hume, Mill, on the other,
reemerge in philosophy of language and mind with the notions
of propositions and propositional attitudes—and in the many
and various disciplines that borrow this form of discourse. For
the widespread belief that mental verbs such as “wants” or “be-
lieves” pick out inner states of an individual and are the vehicles
of content also straddles uncomfortably the excessive postula-
tion of transcendent entities—under the guise of semantic or
propositional “content”—and the theory of ideas that has been
imported with very little change by those who take this content
to be a matter of internal representations. Indeed, the puzzling
juxtaposition of rational guidance and law-governed processes
that Small detects in philosophy of action is already thoroughly
entrenched in the accepted canon—within which today’s epis-
temological debate is framed—that mental verbs such as “be-
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 5 no. 5 [4]
lieves”, “thinks”, “wants”, and so on pick out inner, causally
efficacious, representational states.
Ryle’s express aim in philosophy was to undo the tangles and
knots inwhich philosophers, in particular, become caught when
they start to consider expressions involving abstractions. It is
at this point that we tend to become misled by grammatical
prima facies or worse: we tend to import “moribund” doctrines
ofmeaning in our attempt to display the logic or (as I shall call it)
the saying-power of these expressions. We should thus recog-
nise that Ryle’s many examples of the function of sentences
containing verbs and adverbs we classify as “mental” are not
part of the construction of a theory of belief, knowledge, or in-
telligence. Nor, by parity of reasoning, should he be expected to
be offering an account of skill, habit, capacities, or dispositions
rather than just noting some of the similarities and differences
between them, including points at which they merge. They are
reminders of just a few of the core and well-established roles of
live sentences to which these expressions contribute. But these
reminders have a particular purpose: they are intended to func-
tion as correctives or rebuttals to any putative theory or account
of the meaning of these expressions that would deprive them
of their power to play these central roles. To put the point even
more forcefully, the evidence is not (merely) that because he de-
clared his dissatisfaction with “isms” in philosophy, or declared
that the philosopher’s role was one of clarification, we are mis-
guided in attributing to himpositive theories. It is rather that his
view of how verbs, adjectives, adverbs, noun phrases, and so on,
contribute to the sense or what-is-said in live sentences forbids
the construction of such accounts. To understand the radical-
ness of this view from today’s perspective, some background is
in order.1
1What follows is a synthesis of my published work in which the topics
broached here are developed in more detail. The reader will find in these
articles full references to Ryle’s work from which my description of his pro-
Philosophical Logic
Ryle saw himself as among a group of philosophers, including
Husserl, Meinong, Frege, Moore, and Russell, who were revolt-
ing against the “idea-psychology” of Hume and Mill, demand-
ing the emancipation of logic from psychology. A certain view
of meaning, tracing back to Plato’s theory of Forms, seemed to
provide these philosophers with an escape-route from subjec-
tivist theories of thinking. In spite of the fact that their actual
wrestlings with conceptual difficulties involved no direct intu-
itings of super-observational objects, existing outside space and
time, Husserl nonetheless talked of intuiting essences, Moore of
inspecting concepts, and Russell of acquaintanceship of univer-
sals. It was supposed to be these objects of a higher-order, with
pride of place given to the propositions with which we became
directly acquainted, that we grasp in thought and judgement.
The problem is that the view of meaning implied by these
metaphors fails from the start. According to Ryle, Russell, when
writing The Principles of Mathematics, came to see what the later
Plato had realised in Parmenides. Some words and phrases do
not function as “mentioning expressions” at all, so they do not
designate or stand for objects, let alone Platonic essences or uni-
versals. Nor, we might add, do they designate properties, rela-
tions, events, processes or states of affairs. This holdsnot only for
formal, “syncategorematic”, expressions such as “some”, “all”,
“if”, “not”, etc. but also—crucially—for any statement that is to
be elucidated—or as I shall put it, whose saying power may be
exhibited—by these logical concepts. Consider live verbs. The
contribution to the meaning of the sentence made by the word
“knows” in “John knows the date of Easter” is neither captured
by a list which conjoins John, knowledge, and a particular fact,
nor, in speaking intelligibly about knowledge are we speaking
gramme has developed. A sample includes Tanney (2009a,b,c, 2011, 2013,
2015, 2017).
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of a mental process (or state) that is distinct from but connected
to another state of affairs which is known. To repeat: the saying
power of such sentences is not revealed by supposing that (for
example) the live verb “knows” contributes to the meaning of
the complete sentence by referring to some entity in (much) the
same way as “John” designates my husband. Nor, by parity of
reasoning, can the saying-power of “John knows that I will be
making dinner tomorrow” be captured by a list which conjoins
John, Knowledge, and that which (whatever it is) is alleged to
be mentioned in the noun-clause that complements the verb.
Like the logical constants, live verbs and (and their noun
phrase complements) are also auxiliary to complete sayings. So,
too, incidentally are proper names. Except in certain circum-
stances, though indeed they serve to designate, they say nothing
by themselves, and thus Russell’s doctrine of incomplete sym-
bols was mistaken in thinking that proper names of any sort
(including logically proper names) should set the standard for
completeness in the first place. The naming of something, as
Ryle and later Wittgenstein both insisted, is preliminary to say-
ings. These logical constants, live verbs, and complements are
nonetheless significant, so it remains to be seen how they con-
tribute sense to the sayings as wholes.
It had been common ground, Ryle reminds us, of different
theories about the nature of concepts that by “concept” we refer
to the meaning a word or phrase irrespective of the language
in which the word occurs. We do not, however, convey what
is signified by a live verb, adjective, or adverb and so on, by
talking of the concepts knows, thoughtful, or intentionally. We find
it more natural to use the corresponding abstract noun, which,
in turn, promotes the tendency to suppose that in investigating
knowledge, thought, or intention we are perceiving or intuiting
essences of the abstract objects thereby designated. But if we
reject the idea that this exercise could in principle accommodate
what is said in complete sentences, what becomes of conceptual
analysis? As philosophers, what are we doing if not inspecting
these transcendent objects?
We should interject here that the philosophers who prac-
tice conceptual analysis today would suggest that it would be
more in keeping with their practice to insist that the notion of
object-inspection has a tendency to mislead. They take their
cue instead from both Plato’s Socrates and Moore whose ac-
tual practice of conducting their enquires involved inspecting
the use of expressions in order to discern definitions or rules
that govern their correct employment. Nonetheless, the sup-
position was and still persists that these words stand for or
“express” a concept, from which pre-established, stable, time-
less and communication- and other circumstance-independent
meaning rules can be extracted. The proposition or truth-or-
falsehood they combine to form is what we grasp in thought
and judgment.
Ryle creditsWittgenstein with turning this notion on its head,
in suggesting that sense or meaning applies in the first instance
to complete (live) sentences. I credit Ryle with making the con-
sequences of this game-changer explicit. Concepts are to be con-
strued, neither as abstract objects nor as a timeless, independent
compendium of rules that set conditions on the employment of
the cognate expressions (verbs, etc.) which “express” them. It is
the other way around: to talk about “the concept of knowledge”
or “the concept(s) ofmind” is a short-handwayof alluding to the
saying-power of live sentences in which cognate verbs, such as
“knows”, or adverbs, such as “intelligently”, etc., figure. To use
Ryle’s metaphor: the analogy of the meaning of a sentence and
themeaning of its parts is not that of amolecule and the atoms of
which it is composed any more than a human face is a molecule
of which its profile, complexion and expression are atoms. Yet,
just as we can discern the profile, complexion, and expression
of different human faces in respect of these abstractible features,
so can we discern the contribution word-meanings make to the
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sense of a sentence by the abstractible differences and similari-
ties they make to the live sentences in which they play a role.
An elucidation of a concept then, involves looking at the
discernible similarities and differences its cognate expressions
(verbs, adjectives, adverbs, nouns, noun phrases) make to the
complete sayings in which they figure. The differences, here, are
important, since a givenwordwill, like complex expressions and
grammatical constructions, in different sorts of context, express
ideas of an indefinite range of differing logical types and, there-
fore, with different logical powers. In these different contexts,
that is, the same word or expression will contribute differently
to what is said, as revealed in: the implications licensed, per-
mitted, and forbidden; the compatibility or incompatibilitywith
other related sayings or doings; its being evidence or grounds
for or against other sayings; the manner required to be criticised
and assessed, including, but by no means limited to, tests for
truth or falsehood; the scale of liability to which the speaker
is held accountable when in error and the number of ways she
can go wrong; and so forth and so on. These ever-changing
differences in the logical ties—the elasticities of significance—
of natural language expressions, even those that are core and
well-established, constitute an additional obstacle to attempts to
provide analytic definitions, a general account or theory, or the
idea that the abstract noun such as “knowledge” (for example)
functions to designate something that we grasp in thought.
Indeed, even the professional implements of philosophers—
the concepts of proposition, concept, relation, application, aboutness,
identity, and disposition tend to lead philosophers into trouble of
different kinds, as do those of quality, substance, state, number, logi-
cal construction, and even category. Philosophers’ talk about cate-
gories, for Ryle, involves assertions aboutwhat sorts of combina-
tions of certain factorswith otherswould andwouldnot produce
absurdities. Only expressions (and not things) can be accused of
absurdity, so it follows that category-propositions are semantic
propositions. They should be seen, not as introducing meta-
physical or natural mysteries, but as short-hand ways of stating,
for example, that the abstractible factors of propositions—the
concepts in question—can only be substituted for others that
would perform the same jobs. Given this understanding of the
philosopher’s concept of category, it would be pure myth, Ryle
says, to imagine there is a finite number of categories, any more
than there is a complete table of the varieties of grammatical
constructions of English sentences. The ramifications of this for
formal logic’s contribution to philosophical investigation is re-
markable. For although the symbols in a given code symbolism
in formal logic may be adequate to display type-differences in
some particular matter of concern, we can never say that they
are adequate for the symbolisation of all possible differences in
form.
Now, thiswould seem todeprivephilosophyof its subjectmat-
ter and—it must be said—in an important way, it does. There
are no transcendent objects to study, no fixed, context-free rules
that determine the application conditions for concepts, indeed
no way of classifying the logical power of these words in ad-
vance or independently of studying the way they contribute
to the saying-power of complete expressions in the contexts in
which their (ever changing) elasticitieswill be revealed. If philo-
sophical elucidation no longer amounts to the inspection of ex-
pressions through the slots of a logician’s stencil or through the
prisms of a scholastic classification system, what is a philoso-
pher to do? Ryle’s response: She can attempt to dissolve puzzles
and apparent contradictions that arise when, for example, she
mistakes the superficial grammatical form of an expression as
revelatory of its logical power. This includes, as we have seen
expressions that belong to her own professional toolkit.
AsWittgenstein’s express aim inphilosophy is to “show thefly
the way out of the fly-bottle”, Ryle’s is to submit to “philosophi-
cal destruction tests” our initial attempts to abstract, generalise,
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and theorise about the ideas, or distinguishable factors, we iden-
tify in our expressions. It is also a destruction-test that is applied
to philosophers’ theories—which deliberately recommend that
we operate with an idea as if it belongs to a particular category
and thus results in paradoxes or absurdities. Ryle’s reductio ad
absurdum arguments, which he uses as his “flail and winnowing
fan,” by and large serve to show that these recommendations
which force the expressions of natural language into the too few
formal dockets that logicians have to offer fail to account for
their saying-power. Indeed, Ryle is at his most impatient with
philosophers who ignore what he deemed advances in philo-
sophical logic; not only of those ignorant, in particular, of the
insight that the logical form of an expression does not follow its
grammatical form, but of those who accept too rigidly the for-
mal apparatus of logicians for understanding and elucidating
philosophically important expressions.
This view of the logic of natural language and its implication
for philosophical enquiry was fully developed by the time Ryle
decided to put his destruction-tests into action by concentrating
on central concepts of the mind.
The Concept of Mind
Ryle’s explicit target in The Concept of Mind is what he calls the
“official doctrine” of which intellectualism, with its rationalist
leanings, is but one aspect. We are familiar with this Carte-
sian doctrine today, for the well-known philosophical puzzles
it engenders—ontological, epistemological, and semantic—are
among those we study in courses in the philosophy of mind
and are collected under the broad heading of “The Mind-Body
Problem”. Today’s preoccupation of finding a place for the
mind in a world that is fundamentally physical, or of accommo-
dating the mental within a principled physicalist scheme, and
of doing so without losing what we value, or find special, in
our nature as creatures of minds, is a modern incarnation of
the official doctrine. Its presuppositions give rise to concerns
about mental-physical causation, self-knowledge, the problem
of other minds, and the puzzle of how a necessarily private lan-
guage, such as a language of thought, could provide thematerial
for communication.
Though it iswidely acknowledged that Ryle’s argumentswere
instrumental in combatting the view that themind and body are
different kinds of things or substances, it needs a great deal of in-
sistence to convince philosophers today that they affect any view
that trespasses the logical type differences between the roles that
mental and physical predicates contribute to the statements in
which they figure. This very wide net yields an extraordinarily
large haul.
Even at the time of Ryle’s writing, the differences between the
mental and the physical were not only portrayed as differences
of thing or stuff, but also of attribute, state, process, change,
cause and effect. Not only were minds thought to be things, but
different sorts of things from bodies, so were mental processes
thought to be causes and effects but different sorts of causes
and effects from bodily movements. A rejection of this para-
mechanical hypothesis would not only affect quaint views about
the will. Nor would it merely threaten causal theories of action.
For the hypothesis is embodied in the very idea that mental
predicates serve to name or mention—that is pick out or refer
to—content-bearing, causally-efficacious internal states.
Let us set aside here the well-known problems of the explana-
tory power of the mental and mental causation and concentrate
on the type-trespasses that threaten when we try to make sense
of the notion that the saying power that mental verbs, such
as “believes” or “knows”, contributes to the live sentences in
which they figure can be captured by assuming them to pick
out inner—and thus “occult”, at least to observers if not to the
subject herself—mental states, events, or processes. (We will
hold off until the next section the problems—prefigured in the
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discussion above—with the suggestion that these are “vehicles
of propositional or semantic content”.)
How does this view gel with the saying power of attribu-
tions of knowledge? When you, the reader of this introduction,
are told that So-and-So knows French you are handed a ticket
with which you can make a number of moves. This ticket will
also serve as a justification for your having made these “jour-
neys”. There are indefinitely many and therefore innumerable
inferences and predictions, for example, that the ticket licenses,
together with indefinitely many and therefore innumerable ex-
ceptions that might render the ticket invalid for particular trans-
actions. That is because they are dependent on the particular
inflections of “knows French” as this expression is used on the
occasion and on the particular circumstances pertaining to the
one to whom the knowledge is attributed. You learn the former,
by and large, as youmaster English and you come to understand
the general and particular circumstances that might permit or
defeat these dealings. I can point you in the direction of what
you have learned by reminding you of the kind of permissions
and limits you might anticipate: for example, that John (my
husband), when reading Le Monde, would understand what it
says unless it happens to be an article about monetary policy,
that John would be able to translate into English articles writ-
ten there, including the articles on monetary policy, but would
not be able to draw the inferences or make the predictions for
the latter topics as he might for those on politics. Emmanuel
Macron, by contrast, would be expected to elaborate those arti-
cles on monetary policy but might not (for all I know) be able
to translate them into Russian. Crediting a child, or indeed, a
dog, with knowing French will involve rather different sets of
standards. Solutré, for example, manifests his understanding of
“Viens ici!” when he comes to me on this command and of “Au
lit!” by going upstairs to bed. But his knowledge of French is
rather limited, as one would expect of a largely untrained dog.
The verbs of knowledge will manifest their elasticities as they
are called into service for the many jobs they are given: one can-
not expect that their contribution to what is said remain fixed
independently of the circumstances or the context.
Let us consider another example. When I overhear John say
to the dog, “I know you know I’m about to go to the tip” he
hands me a ticket to infer, first, that he, my husband, is indeed
preparing to go to the déchetterie municipale, and that Solutré
has exercised some sort of recognitional capacity which, as it
turns out, was triggered by John’s collection of empty wine bot-
tles. The ticket would also serve to render intelligible Solutré’s
sudden excitement, barking, and attempt to fetch his lead. If
John had said instead “Solutré thinks I’m going to the tip” as
a response, perhaps, to my question why the dog has become
excited all of a sudden, John leaves open the question whether
Solutré is correct. Obviously, the saying power or logical ties of
my claim—to a friend, say, who thinks John might have misun-
derstood my intentions—that “John knows that I am about to
go to the tip” will differ in various ways. We cannot expect or
render intelligible any concomitant excitement on John’s part (at
least not without additional information) or attempts to fetch a
lead. We can, however, make sense of John’s look of amusement,
his putting various rubbish bags in the car, and so forth and so
on.
Further, a more general attempt at a reminder of the say-
ing power of “So-and-so knows French” or “So-and-so knows
that such-and-such” will, like the elucidation of any cognitive
or affective mental verb, necessarily embody subjunctive con-
ditionals (what would happen if ) and other subordinate clauses
introduced with expressions such as “not”, “in order to”, “un-
less”, “when”, “any”, “at the same time as”, “most”, either . . . or’
and “in order not to”. Ryle’s frequent italicisation of these “in-
troducers” serves to emphasise that the job performed by verbs
of cognition, for example, require not just some simple auxiliary
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nouns, adjectives, or verbs, but a host of syntactically variegated
clauses that make reduction tomere episodes or happenings (for
example, in terms of physical behaviour) impossible.
The very notion, then, that “knows”, “believes”, “surmises”,
and “thinks” function to pick out cognitive states, or that
“wants”, “desires”, “intends”, or “wills” pick out affective
ones—indeed, that the role of these verbs is to name states,
properties, events or processes, let alone whose relation of iden-
tity with states of the physical, biological, neurological organ-
ism is an open question, is sufficient to call foul. Worse, the
thought that they function to pick out a sort of state which hov-
ers uncomfortably between the two in having both logical and
causal properties—the idea that they function to pick out “repre-
sentations” understood as causally-efficacious, content-bearing
states—is to introduce a “theoretical posit” that amounts to a
very reification of the category mistake in question. It is al-
ready to have disastrously misunderstood the role that mental
verbs such as “believes”, “thinks”, “knows”, and “wants” con-
tribute to the sentences in which they figure. The puzzles about
self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, mental causation,
and necessarily private languages arise from Cartesian-inspired
views about the relation between the mind and body and these
are exacerbated, not resolved, by theories including physicalism
and functionalism which accept these patently false presuppo-
sitions about how mental expressions function.
Several warnings about how this short discussion may be apt
to be misinterpreted are perhaps in order. First, anxiety, de-
pression, and pain are examples of “mental states” and doing
arithmetic and telling jokes are examples of “mental processes”
in a perfectly ordinary (and non-problematic) sense of the terms.
To borrowWittgenstein’s metaphor, describing them thus helps
to show the logical or grammatical post atwhichwe station these
expressions and may be helpful in averting misunderstanding.
To assert that Ryle denied the existence of mental states or pro-
cesses without further clarification would threaten to confuse
his rejection of assumptions in philosophical logic with his re-
jection of a commonplace. Second, the sentence “Solutré knows
that John is going to the tip” is one which embodies a mental
verb which takes as its complement a noun-phrase introduced
by “that”. This purely grammatical fact is not in dispute. What
is contested is whether the saying power of such expressions
can be elucidated by assuming that they function to designate
something called “propositional attitudes”—which are in turn
cashed out as a locatable (inner/outer) causally efficacious vehi-
cle of propositional (or other sort of representational) content—
the nature of which occupied philosophers for several decades
and now is taken for granted in functional/representational
theories of mind. Three, philosophers interested in provid-
ing theories about the nature of mental phenomena will baulk
at the idea that their “causal hypotheses” are to be construed
as application-conditions for mental expressions. They insist
they are making claims—empirical claims—about the nature
of these concepts’ referents. The problem however is that the
scientific/metaphysical realism that underpins this rejoinder—
that ordinary mental concepts purport to refer to items or prop-
erties whose nature is open to empirical investigation—is pre-
ciselywhat Ryle is challenging. Four, one argument hemarshals
against this view is that the comments we make that embody
mental expressions show them to have a use which is both reg-
ular and effective. We know how to make them with general
correctness and to correct others when they turn out to be con-
fused or mistaken: indeed an elucidation of the logical ties or
saying power of these expressions will include typical consid-
erations to which we would appeal in checking, correcting, or
justifying their use. A theory of the mental that entailed that
there could be no regular or effective use of these mental expres-
sions has to answer to the fact that their account has managed to
throw out a part of the phenomenon they set out to study with
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their theory of it. This charge has nothing to do with the un-
tenable suggestion championed by the logical empiricists about
the constraints they sought to put on anymeaningful statement.
Complaints that Ryle is a “verificationist aboutmeaning” utterly
miss their mark.
I have hammered home the consequences, as I see them, of
accepting the implication of Ryle’s (and Wittgenstein’s) work in
philosophical logic and how this affects today’s canon in philos-
ophy of mind. I have done so in order to bring home how prob-
lematic it is even to employ the vocabulary of “content-bearing
states” or “representational states” or “propositional attitude
states” when attempting to assess Ryle’s contributions to phi-
losophy of mind and epistemology. The problems are merely
iterated when theorists posit so-called “states of knowledge-
that”, “states of knowledge-how” or “propositional knowledge
of special kinds of facts known under a practical mode of pre-
sentation”. My particular examples above should put to rest
the very idea that such entities can be discerned from the func-
tion of sentences in which these expressions ordinarily figure.
Furthermore, it should be clear that when Ryle used the expres-
sion “know that” to contrast with “know how” in his arguments
against intellectualism he was not tracking what we ordinarily
imply every time we use the expression “knows that”. There is
no one thing that we ordinarily imply; nor, in particular, is our
meaning elucidated by postulating a relation between a named
subject such as Solutré and either an abstract object or an internal
representation of whatever degree of complexity. He was coin-
ing a very particular and pithy way of distinguishing between
performances that involve prior theoretical operations and those
nonetheless thoughtful or intelligent performances that do not.
Intellectualism
We saw earlier that Ryle rejects the traditional thought that
propositions are abstract objects, whether these be construed
as the meanings (qua nominata) of sentences, the (external) re-
lata of acts of thinking, or, therefore, as the timeless, context-free,
special subjectmatter of logic. They should be construed instead
as abstractions from what live sentences of different languages,
idioms, authors, or dates saywhen these sentences—for the pur-
poses at hand—are deemed to say the same thing or perform
the same role.
Similarly, the saying-power of a word or phrase is a func-
tional factor—a discernible common locus—of a range of pos-
sible tellings, askings, advisings, threatenings, promisings, and
so on. But if we thus invert the natural assumption that the
saying-power of words and phrases can be learned, classified
or discussed before the consideration of entire sayings, what
becomes of the traditional doctrine in epistemology that the
apprehension of propositions (qua sentence-meanings) and the
apprehension of concepts (qua word-meanings) are supposed
to be part of a psychological explanation of the ability to under-
stand the complete expressions or those in which the concepts
figure? It was supposed to be these objects of a higher-order,
with which we become directly acquainted, that we “grasp” in
thought and judgment.
Wittgenstein, in Philosophical Investigations, wonders what in-
clined his younger self to think that in speaking and under-
standing a language one is operating a calculus in accordance
with strict rules. And he goes on to engage in a painstaking
examination of the different senses in which wemay be “guided
by” or “following” rules. The same question occupies Ryle, who
explores an ambiguity in the sense in which natural laws, math-
ematical truths, and the laws of logic “apply” to the world, and
who comes to the same conclusion. There had better be a way of
“following a rule which does not involve an interpretation”—to
use Wittgenstein’s expression—or a way of performing success-
fully by wont and not by prior theoretical operations—to use
Ryle’s. For if we require the following of higher-order rules as
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a necessary condition for any successful performance—then we
will be committed to a vicious regress.
To put the argument succinctly, performing some activity in-
telligently, rationally, or with reason cannot require prior theo-
retical operations such as deliberating, calculating, or following
rules since these are activities that are themselves performed
intelligently, rationally, or with reason. So it must be possible
to act intelligently, rationally, or with reason without prior de-
liberation, calculation, or rule-following. Otherwise one would
need to suppose the existence of prior theoretical operations ad
infinitum.
Let us look at the situationmore carefully. Weare led, it seems,
to talk about standards or norms in the first place because some
of our activities or performances admit of good, bad, ormedium
marks. They are thus judged in relation to whether they come
up to or fall short of standards. Perhaps in a large number of
cases, these standards are merely implicit—they can be “read
off” or abstracted from successful performances or activities by
a tactician or theorist. Once codified into instructions or prin-
ciples, they may be used subsequently as an aid in teaching or
as a method for checking whether the moves have achieved the
requisite standard, or in the light of which a participant in the
practicemayhenceforth guide her performances. When they are
thus used, the participants are engaging in a second-order activ-
ity that can sometimes—but not always—help them to achieve
the standards sought for the lower-order practice. Why “not
always”? First, following rules, like maps, recipes, formulae,
or instructions in general involves sub-performances that them-
selves canbedonebadly, passably, orwell. This includes reading
the instructions correctly as opposed to misreading them; fig-
uring out how they are to apply to the case at hand as opposed
to misinterpreting what they require; and then implementing
them correctly in one’s performance. These are discernibly dif-
ferent ways in which the second-order operations might, and
indeed do, go wrong. Since the consulting, interpreting and
implementing of instructions or principles are themselves per-
formances that can be done well, passably, or badly, simply
engaging in them cannot be sufficient for success in the original
activity. And further, unless the higher-order activity is itself
part of the challenge (as it is in logic and math exams when you
are expected to “show your work”) consulting the rules is often
not necessary for being credited with having met the appropri-
ate standards. For one may have engaged successfully in the
original activity without having to reflect on or take a sideways
glance at second-order principles.
This idea that we grasp propositions or the meanings qua
nominata of sentences goes back to Plato and resurfaces, with
variations, in Frege, Russell, and early Wittgenstein. Indeed it is
the analogy with this view about sentence-meaning that funds
the equally problematic view that our mental “states” are the
vehicles of propositional, semantic, or representational content
as well.
Perhaps the confusion arises when logical norms, mathemati-
cal truths, or concepts and propositions construed as word- and
sentence-meanings, are themselves thought to be part of a Pla-
tonic third-realm and not, like instructions, recipes, or maps,
obviously conventional symbolic structures that may be mis-
read, misinterpreted or misapplied. The idea seems to be that
what is used in the teaching of practices, consulted in the course
of them, or read off by an observer, aremere expressions of rules:
the real rules are something atwhich these expressions only ges-
ture. Once grasped, apprehended or intuited by a participant in
these normative activities there is no rational option but to do
as the rule requires: apprehension of the rule is sufficient to de-
termine and thus to explain how the one who grasps it acts as it
mandates. According to thismythical picture, when expressions
of the rules are not used in the learningor teachingof the activity,
nor within the practice itself, those who have mastered it can be
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creditedwithmore than knowledge bywont of the relevant stan-
dards of correctness: they have (somehow) come into cognitive
contact with rules that determine these standards, unexpressed
or unrepresented though they may be, which (somehow) guide
them and thus (somehow) explain their ability to act as they
mandate. A “cavalierly” realist version of this myth supposes
that the real rule, shorn of its expression, exists independently
not only of any particular individual’s grasp and propensity to
act in accordance with it, but independently of human practices
altogether: the rule consists in steps that are already drawn in
advance.
A variation on this picture is that anyone who issues a com-
mand, who means something by an utterance, or who intends
that his expression be taken in a certain way has in mind the
way his command, meaning, or expression of intention should
be acted upon in all possible circumstances, extending indefi-
nitely into the future, as if the successful implementation of his
command, or uptake of his meaning or intention, follows steps
already drawn—in his mind—in advance and independently of
the particular circumstances of his utterance.
The reach of this fantasy extends tomost of the debated topics
in philosophy today. Its attraction, as well as its metaphysical
mysteriousness, is due to its seeming to accommodate the ob-
jectivity as well as the force of that which we hold most dear.
For “rules” we can substitute “reasons”, “principles of moral-
ity”, “linguistic meaning”, and “mathematical truths”, to name
a few. Moreover, if a person’s acting morally, with reason, in-
tentionally, or with knowledge of any kind is a matter of her
having a private grasp of these rules, as the mythical picture
suggests, then the epistemology of rule-following brings in tow
further wonders about how we could ever know that one is to
be credited (or not) with acting in any of these ways.
The attempt to “naturalise” this picture has done nothing to
avoid its inherent problems. Jerry Fodor was in no doubt, for
example, that his proposals were well within the line of fire of
such regress arguments. In the introduction to The Language of
Thought—which is partly responsible for the wide acceptance
of functionalist and representationalist (if not computationalist)
theories of mind—he remarks that it is difficult to think of an
area of cognitive psychology in which the array of arguments in
The Concept of Mind would not apply or in which Ryle does not
apply them. He says, astutely, that
. . . it is perhaps Ryle’s central point that “Cartesian” (i.e., mental-
istic) psychological theories treat what is really a logical relation
between aspects of a single event as though it were a causal re-
lation between pairs of distinct events. It is this tendency to give
mechanistic answers to conceptual questions which, according to
Ryle, leads the mentalist to orgies of regrettable hypostasis: i.e., to
attempting to explain behaviour by reference to underlying psy-
chological mechanisms. (Fodor 1975, 5)
Fodor goes on to acknowledge that if this is a mistake, his whole
discussion is in trouble. Indeed. For if we are to understand the-
oretical operations by analogywith, as Fodor suggested, deliber-
ation before acting, or hypothesis-testing, or by analogywith the
consultation of instructions, recipes, maps, diagrams, formulae,
and so on, then there must be the possibility that the delibera-
tion or consultation, interpretation and implementation of the
instructions—even if it is allegedly implicit or unconscious—
goes awry. This is a simple corollary of the fact that an appeal to
norms is what allows us to credit a “move” with good, medium,
or bad marks. If we insist, against the recommendations of
the regress argument, that the individual credited with a good
performance must have somehow been guided by the rules em-
bodying these norms, then, presumably she must have avoided
being misguided by them. As Will Small shows in his con-
tribution to this volume, this problem simply reappears when
philosophers attempt to introduce additional layers of “norma-
tive mechanisms”.
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In defending his own version of a representational theory
of mind—one that construes cognition as (implicit, first-order)
rule-governed computations over syntactically structured sym-
bols or representations—Fodor attempts to avoid the regress
by claiming that the (implicit) appeal to explicit rules is halted
since the second-order rules that govern these first-order com-
putations are reducible to built-in causal processes. This, in
effect, is to concede the original conclusion of Wittgenstein’s
and Ryle’s regress arguments, to wit, that there must be a way
of following a rule that does not require an interpretation. or
“knowledge-how” is logically prior, and thus not reducible, to
“knowledge-that”. It is also to concede that not every perfor-
mancewhich can be evaluated in the light of standards or norms
must have involved an explicit or appeal to those norms.
Nonetheless, Fodor, and those that follow in positing further
and further iterations of normative mechanisms, nonetheless
owe us an explanation why we needed to posit these occult pro-
cesses to begin with. For doing so resurrects all of the mysteries
of the mind-body problem discussed above. The fact is that we
just do credit individuals with achievements or blame them for
failures—in acting rationally, for reasons, morally, intelligently,
in speaking and understanding a language, and so on—in virtue
of having or failing to have satisfied norms, even if we cannot
credit them with having cast a sideways glance at any puta-
tive instructions that codify these norms. We certainly do not
base these normative judgements on “explanations to the best
hypothesis” about their (mechanised) subsystems.
In any case, rules have different explanatory functions from
those of natural laws. The rules that govern rational action
or logical inference, for example, help us to identify what is
incorrect in certain performances and correct in others. Such ex-
planations function by showing how the performance attains or
fails to attain the standards or norms set for the practice. These
are explanations relatively high up Ryle’s “sophistication lad-
der”. They are descriptions of the referee, theorist, or tactician.
Once theoretical operations such as hypothesis-testing, deliber-
ation, map-reading, following diagrams, images, formulae, etc.
are “mechanised” in this ideal fashion, two different kinds of
explanation are conflated. The first, by appeal to standards or
norms that are codified in the performance-rules that govern
some activity or practice; the second, by appeal to causal rela-
tions or to the laws of nature which are supposed to subsume
them.
This is perhaps what Ryle means when he says that the intel-
lectualist legend should be rejected not merely because it tells
myths but because those it tells are not of the right type to
account for the facts which they are invented to explain. As
Bäckström and Gustafsson so nicely demonstrate, the idioms in
which they are expressed belong to different forms of discourse.
They come from different founts.
* * *
I have suggested that theverynotionof content-bearing, causally
efficacious mental states, let alone representational states of
knowledge-that or knowledge-how, and so forth, embodies the
very presuppositions that Ryle calls into question. Thus my
pessimism about engaging in a debate in which Ryle is to play a
part against a framework in which so much of what he has had
argued against is taken for granted as true. But the contributors
to this volume are braver souls than I. It is to their work that we
should now turn.
Julia Tanney
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